墨西哥在某种程度上无意间将自己置于了石油工业的中心’2020年最紧迫的问题– just when it seemed that Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States and a whole array of prominent oil-producing countries reached an agreement on future OPEC+ production cuts, the Latin American nation rejected the proposed quota of a 400kbpd output curtailment and eventually accepted a 100kbpd cut after prolonged talks and an intervention by U.S. President Trump. Yet as long as 佩姆克斯 keeps on piling up debt and oil prices continue their downward movement the OPEC+ agreement notwithstanding, shouldn’墨西哥制定了更加务实的路线并尽可能削减产量？下面我们将找出为什么墨西哥有5个原因’石油业注定要遭受苦难。
当L总统ó佩斯·奥夫拉多（pez Obrador）上任后，他发誓要履行他的一项主要竞选承诺，到2024年将石油产量提高到2.7mbpd。’s tenure and 墨西哥菜 crude production continues to decline –目前为1.72mbpd，在短短3年内下降了近15％– and given how strained relations are with international upstream investors, there is little hope to believe that the upcoming months will bring about any significant change. Mexico in general and 佩姆克斯 in particular have means to mitigate losses, however the extent thereof seems somewhat inadequate.
佩姆克斯 Crude Oil Production and Exports in 2017-2020 (million barrels per day).
佩姆克斯’s traditional annual hedge, oftentimes presented as some sort of magic wand against market turbulence, will only yield some 300 million this year. This is primarily because the 佩姆克斯 hedge only covers some 20% of crude exports, having been fixed at a price of 49 per barrel from December 2019 to December 2020. There exists a separate Finance Ministry oil price hedge, the details of which remain classified – the 墨西哥菜 authorities have repeatedly stated that these put options can fully compensate for any missing government revenue. Essentially, 佩姆克斯 is certain not to recover all of the short-received revenues which is quite troubling on the back of “Black Monday”（4月20日）在WTI率先将墨西哥原油篮子带入负面地区的情况下。
欧佩克+会议结束仅几周后，墨西哥石油监管机构CNH（Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos) has stated it would seek a formal explanation from 佩姆克斯 on how it intends to carry out the 100kbpd production cut. One would presuppose that a decision to cut output would be of concerted nature, however in Mexico it resulted in a chaotic situation in which no one really understands who should lead the mandated curtailments, 佩姆克斯 or the 能源 Ministry itself. The irony of it all is that Mexico only committed to 2 months of production cuts in May-June 2020, despite the general OPEC+ agreement charting the global course until April 2022; moreover the United States took up an additional 250kbpd of ‘’Mexican”输出承诺以促进交易。
佩姆克斯 has in a way become hostage of its own importance – as oil companies across the world cut capital expenditures for 2020, 佩姆克斯 is pretending it can carry on with its assumed $16.7 billion budget for the year. Obviously this did not go unnoticed with market watchers; if 佩姆克斯 does not react appropriately then the 墨西哥菜 NOC will burn most if not all of the credit facilities available and still end up with a $10 billion shortfall. With an aggregate debt level of $105 billion, this is certainly no good news - the 墨西哥菜 NOC has posted an unprecedentedly high loss last year at $18.3 billion, almost doubling year-on-year despite increasing oil prices.
The low price environment and poor financial situation might push the 墨西哥菜 government to scrap or postpone the construction of the planned 340kbpd Dos Bocas Refinery in AMLO’塔巴斯科州（Tabasco）的故乡，被认为已成为墨西哥最大，最复杂的州。这位四面楚歌的总统的宠物项目造价高达80亿美元，一直走在L的前列ópez Obrador’为终止对美国精炼产品的进口依赖而进行的努力（假设投产日期为2023年）。似乎有太多原因表明Dos Bocas的完成– no usable finances left, depressed gasoline prices, the 墨西哥菜 peso’近期的贬值，低价的投标过程以及随之而来的不可避免的后果。
跟随原油市场’s “``黑色星期一''于4月20日，当美国期货有史以来首次跌至负数区域时，商定的OPEC +减产已经证明了它们的不足。墨西哥原油篮子跌破PEMEX’的收支平衡成本（根据2019年的数据，约为每桶14美元）降至整个21世纪的最低点 世纪。冠状病毒大流行使墨西哥政府真的很难向PEMEX投资，因为恢复病毒缠身的经济生活是一个更为重要的目标。因此，PEMEX将必须自行寻找解决方案并相对快速地找到它们–2022年以后的投资看起来越来越成问题。墨西哥’的离岸半周期成本在每桶25-30美元之间波动，在当前的价格环境下，即使是棕地投资也值得怀疑。